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INDONESIA IN 2007
 
Unmet Expectations, 
Despite Improvement 
 
Damien Kingsbury
Abstract
 
In 2007, expectations since the election of President Susilo Bambang Yu-
dhoyono in 2004 have exceeded the capacity of the state to deliver. Economic
indicators remained steady or improved slightly, but there was a growing
sense of disappointment with Yudhoyono’s presidency as well as signs of
challenge to his tenure beyond the current term.
Keywords: Indonesia, expectation, reform, economy, military
 
Introduction
 
It has been a common experience in post-colonial states
that the high expectations that accompanied independence have not been
matched by the state’s capacity to deliver. This has usually produced disap-
pointment and—to contain restive politics within a weak state environment—
often spawns authoritarian political responses.
 
1
 
 It has been almost six decades
 
1. Most discussion around this phenomenon has focused on sub-Saharan Africa, although the
principle applies more broadly. See, e.g., J. Luis, “The Politics of State, Society, and Economy,”
 
International Journal of Social Economics
 
 27:3 (2000), pp. 277–43; P. Englebert, “Pre-Colonial
Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Topical Africa,” 
 
Political Re-
search Quarterly
 
 53:1 (March 2000), pp. 7–36; R. Cornwell, “The End of the Post-Colonial State
System in Africa?” 
 
African Security Review
 
 8:2 (1999); D. Hirschmann, “Early Post-Colonial Bu-
reaucracy as History: The Case of the Lesotho Central Planning and Development Office, 1965–
1975,” 
 
International Journal of African Historical Studies
 
 20:3 (1987), pp. 455–70.
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since Indonesia achieved independence, but the relevance of this proposition
remains. In 1998–99 Indonesia underwent a democratic revolution, which was
taken a significant step further in 2004. The expectations that greeted this po-
litical change were great, but the state’s capacity to deliver was limited. In par-
ticular, the election in 2004 of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Indonesia’s
sixth president was greeted with high expectations. But although he delivered
some real, if at times modest, gains, by 2007 there was a growing sense of dis-
appointment with his tenure. The problem was less with Yudhoyono’s actual
performance as president and more with the enormous task he faced.
 
Politics
 
Yudhoyono’s presidency in some sense reflected conventional democratic pro-
cesses. On the one hand, in 2007 he continued to oversee some cautious and
somewhat limited policy reforms around corruption, financial governance,
and the military. On the other hand, he was open to criticism for inaction or
otherwise failing to deliver on electoral promises. This latter aspect reflects
the role of the opposition in a plural political framework, a function taken up
with some enthusiasm by the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai
Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P), led by former President Megawati
Sukarnoputri.
If the oppositional role of the PDI-P reflected a developing partisan duality
in Indonesia, this in turn indicated increasing coherence around two broad, in-
ternally distinct political groupings, which is commonly taken as a sign of dem-
ocratic political processes. This was not to suggest that a plethora of specific
interests was no longer reflected in multiple political parties but that the role
of government and opposition was becoming more developed and distinct.
More disturbingly though, following signs of internal tensions in 2006, Yu-
dhoyono’s alliance with Vice President Jusuf Kalla in 2007 became increasingly
strained. The friction involved a range of issues, including Yudhoyono’s taking
increasing control over economic matters that had been delegated to Kalla and
the president’s not replacing economic ministers in the May Cabinet reshuffle
as Kalla had wished.
 
2
 
 This was important because Kalla was also chairman of
Golkar, Indonesia’s largest party, with 127 seats of the 550-seat Dewan Per-
wakilan Rakyat (People’s Representative Council, DPR), the lower legislative
house. Golkar had until then helped ensure the success of Yudhoyono’s legis-
lative program.
 
2. Antara News Agency, “Yudhoyono-Kalla Relations Remain Good, Spokesman Says,” May
14, 2007; 
 
Tempointeraktif
 
 [TEMPO Interactive], “Kalla Siap Tinggalkan Yudhoyono Pada 2009”
[Kalla ready to leave Yudhoyono by 2009], 
 

 
www.indonesiaheadlines.com/arsip-berita/59417/
kalla-siap-tinggalkan-yudhoyono-pada-2009.html
 

 
, accessed November 30, 2007; and ibid., Oc-
tober 3, 2007.
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Importantly, while there have been some grumblings about civilian politics
from retired members of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (the Armed Forces of
Indonesia, TNI), especially from officers harking back to the TNI’s formerly
active political role, nonetheless military support continues to subside for any
sort of intervention in the political process. This is not to say that the military
could not at some future point increase its political power but that overall such
power continued to decline. The TNI might be fighting a rearguard action
against reform, and some retired officers might balk at any changes limiting
their access to unofficial sources of income, but their scope for reversing civil-
ian ascendancy appears to be increasingly diminished.
Interestingly, Sutiyoso, Jakarta’s governor for the past 10 years, declared
himself a candidate for the 2009 presidential elections, inviting parties to join
him (since he heads no party himself) and hinting that he had support from the
military. Try Sutrisno, former military head, vice president under Suharto, and
chairman of the Armed Forces Veterans Association, attended Sutiyoso’s an-
nouncement, as did former President Abdurrahman Wahid, who is the head of
Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, along with several
other Muslim clerics.
 
3
 
 Yet, Wahid supports no one but himself as a presidential
candidate, and silence has followed Sutiyoso’s appeal for support.
Sutiyoso’s presidential candidature followed a similar announcement in Sep-
tember 2007 by Megawati.
 
4
 
 Her announcement was intended in part to build a
base from which to challenge Yudhoyono in 2009 but also to halt increasing
fragmentation of the PDI-P and the desertion of branches to newer parties.
The fragmentation of the PDI-P followed its dramatic decline in support (from
33.7% in the 1999 election to 18.5% in 2004) and consequent reduced access
to the spoils of office, although it remains the second largest party in the coun-
try. By May 2007, 53 new political parties had been registered,
 
5
 
 although some
were in fact renamed existing parties that had failed to meet the minimum 3%
vote requirement to remain registered in their former guise. In addition, former
military chief and presidential hopeful Wiranto launched a new party from
which he was expected to stand in the 2009 presidential elections.
One policy issue that resurfaced in 2007 was Indonesia’s plan to build a nu-
clear reactor, the first of four, near Mount Muria, 440 kilometers east of Ja-
karta, to help meet Java’s expanding energy needs. The plan, first announced
in 1996 by then-Research and Technology Minister B. J. Habibie, stalled amid
safety fears given Java’s unstable geology. The plan was relaunched in mid-
2007 for completion in 2016 but was quickly pronounced as 
 
haram
 
 (forbidden)
 
3. A. Sawitri, “Governor Declares Presidential Bid,” 
 
Jakarta Post, 
 
October 2, 2007.
4. R. Sijabat, “Megawati Agrees to Run in 2009 Presidential Election,” ibid., September 11, 2007.
5.
 
Tempointeraktif
 
, “53 Partai Baru Telah Mendaftar Ke Depkumham” [53 new parties already
listed with Department of Justice and Human Rights], May 21, 2007.
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by the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama.
 
6
 
 This was the first time a mainstream Is-
lamic group had made such a pronouncement on nuclear power. Unlike the
earlier plan, the new proposal appeared to have financial backing, although In-
donesia’s neighbors continued to worry about the safety aspect, especially
given the prevailing winds that blow across Malaysia and Singapore, should
there be an accident. Yet, Australia has been quietly supportive, wishing to sell
its uranium to Indonesia.
 
The Economy
 
The government has been implementing various structural reforms, albeit
slowly, and in 2007 there were signs that investment was picking up. Although
economic growth in recent years has been relatively robust, it has failed to cre-
ate sufficient employment to fully absorb growing numbers of entrants to the
labor force, leading to a surging unemployment rate. In order to enhance its
credit standing, the government must improve mid- to-long-term growth pros-
pects by reinvigorating both foreign direct and private domestic investment.
Jakarta’s structural reforms are designed to enhance this growth potential within
a more stable political climate. These reforms encompass alleviation of corrup-
tion, micro-structural reform of the economy, and improvement of the invest-
ment climate.
The outcome of these efforts to date has been mixed. Labor market reform
has met with strong opposition and been postponed. On the other hand, there
have been several tangible gains toward alleviation of corruption, tax and cus-
tom reform, rationalization of local regulations that were distorting business
activities, and improvement of the general investment climate. On balance,
growth in foreign direct investments in Indonesia suggested that foreign inves-
tors’ perceptions of the investment climate has improved as a result of the re-
form efforts.
 
7
 
The Indonesian economy continued to grow at around 6% during early 2007,
reaching 6.3% for the second quarter and just ahead of inflation until the end of
the year, when it slipped 0.1% under.
 
8
 
 This rate, well in excess of the nation’s
 
6. “The Decision of Religious Scholars: The Muria Nuclear Power Plant—Forbidden,” trans.
R. Tanter (from Arabic), 
 

 
http://gc.nautilus.org/Nautilus/australia/re-framing-australia-indonesia-
security/australia-indonesia-nuclear-dynamics/indonesia-nuclear-power/muria-fatwa-materials/
muria-fatwa-documents-english-translations/the-decision-of-religious-scholars-the-muria-nuclear-
power-plant-forbidden
 

 
, accessed November 30, 2007.
7. Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR), “JCR Upgrades Indonesia to BB/BB
 

 
 (FC/LC); Outlook
Positive,” Tokyo, 
 

 
http://www.jcr.co.jp/english/top_cont/rat_info04.php?no
 

 
07i45&PHPSESSID
 

 
893e1ad1c648e99cf9020b2d3b8dbfe1
 

 
, September 6, 2007.
8. Sadayuki Takii and Eric D. Ramstetter, “Survey of Recent Developments,” 
 
Bulletin of Indo-
nesian Economic Studies
 
 43:3 (December 2007), pp. 295–322, 
 

 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0007
4910701727571
 

 
.
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estimated 1.213% population growth in 2007,
 
9
 
 maintained the previous year’s
positive tilt of per capita gross domestic product (GDP). While exports were
up, this economic growth in part reflected renewed investor confidence,
 
10
 
 mark-
edly absent since the collapse of the rupiah in 1997. This could be attributed to
the passing of a new investment law in March 2007, replacing a law passed in
the 1960s, which put domestic and foreign investors on the same legal footing.
However, the passing of a further investment law in July 2007 limited some
areas of foreign investment access, sending mixed signals to an otherwise in-
creasingly interested investment community. Inflation stayed relatively steady
at around 6.3% until October, with an increase in November although with an
overall prediction staying true to the year’s average
 
11
 
 following a spike in the
cost of rice and oil price rises, with Indonesia remaining a net oil importer.
 
12
 
Poverty remained relatively steady at just under 18% or more than 40 mil-
lion people, although the poverty level was set at only 152,847 rupiah ($16.75)
per month, well below the World Bank’s benchmark of a dollar a day, which
would have put around 80 million Indonesians below the poverty line. Simi-
larly, the rupiah was slightly firmer at around 9,124 to the U.S. dollar, while
Indonesia continued to reduce its external debt to GDP ratio, bringing it to
35%, down from 80% in 2000 and just under 40% at the end of 2006.
 
13
 
 Offi-
cial interest rates were also decreased by a percentage point during the year, to
9.75%. Non-performing loans, which had plagued the Indonesian economy
following the Asian financial crisis, eased 0.5% to 8.3%.
 
14
Rule of Law
 
Since the end of the authoritarian New Order era (1966–98), it has been widely
acknowledged that the judiciary is the weakest of Indonesia’s key institutions,
both in terms of judicial training and, more important, corruption. That is, ju-
dicial outcomes have often been poorly adjudicated and subject to financial per-
suasion. Three high-profile cases exemplified Indonesia’s judicial weaknesses
 
9. Total population was about 235 million by July 2007. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
 
CIA World Factbook, 
 
online at 
 

 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/
id.html
 

 
.
10. See S. B. Yudhoyono, “Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden RI: RUU APBN 2008 berdasarkan 8
Prioritas” [State address of the president of the Republic of Indonesia and the government state-
ment on the bill on the state budget for the 2008 fiscal year and its financial note], August 16, 2007.
11. Badan Pusat Statistik [Central Statistics Agency], “September 2007 Inflasi Sebesar 0.80
Persen” [Inflation grows 0.80 percent], October 1, 2007. See also the 
 
Economist
 
, Economist Intel-
ligence Unit, “Country Briefing: Indonesia,” November 14, 2007.
12. Badan Pusat Statistik, “Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product by Industrial Origin,” no.
43/08/Th. X, August 15, 2007.
13. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Briefing: Indonesia.”
14. M. Habir, “Banking Outlook Better as Consolidation Continues,” 
 
Jakarta Post
 
, October 4,
2007.
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in 2007: the government’s failed attempts to reclaim ill-gotten funds from the
Suharto family, former President Suharto’s lawsuit against 
 
Time 
 
magazine for
defamation, and the unresolved murder of human rights activist Munir Said
Thalib.
The Indonesian government’s attempts to bring Suharto to trial for corrup-
tion had collapsed on the grounds that Suharto’s ill-health precluded a trial.
Transparency International estimated that Suharto was the world’s most corrupt
political leader, having amassed a fortune of between $15 billion and $35 bil-
lion. Yet, a civil proceeding by the government to have just $420 million re-
turned in an out-of-court settlement failed when Suharto’s lawyers refused to
accept the claim by the Attorney General’s Office (AGO).
 
15
 
 A further damages
claim against Suharto of 10 billion rupiah ($1.07 million) by the AGO had
also stalled.
 
16
 
Despite Suharto’s having been charged with corruption and his lawyers ne-
gotiating with the government over the extent of repayment, the former presi-
dent successfully sued 
 
Time 
 
magazine for defamation and was awarded one
trillion rupiah (around $128 million) by Indonesia’s Supreme Court. In 1999,
 
Time 
 
had asserted that Suharto had shifted $15 billion to off-shore accounts
 
17
 
in response to which Suharto lodged a defamation suit. Despite the grounds for
defamation being rejected, the Supreme Court decision overturned a decision
by the Appeals Court in 2001 and Jakarta District Court in 2000, upholding
the defamation claim.
 
18
 
 The Supreme Court panel hearing the case included a
former general who had served under Suharto.
In another troubling case, in August 2007 the AGO began a judicial review
of a 2005 Supreme Court ruling acquitting the one suspect in the murder by
poisoning of the high profile human rights activist and critic of the military,
Munir Said Thalib. The unprecedented review was intended to overturn the Su-
preme Court’s ruling that freed Garuda pilot Polycarpus Bidihari Priyanto,
who had been sentenced to 14 years for Munir’s death. The Supreme Court
had ruled that Polycarpus had only committed an administrative violation, i.e.,
the use of a fake document as a part of the conspiracy to murder Munir, and
sentenced him to two years for forgery (he was released under amnesty in De-
cember 2005). However, investigations that implicated the State Intelligence
Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN) in Munir’s murder, including Polycar-
pus’s employment as a BIN agent, were not pursued. This despite evidence
 
15. “Suharto Civil Claim: Mediation Fails,” 
 
Tempointeraktif
 
, September 5, 2007.
16. “Indonesian Lawyers Fail to Agree on Suharto Settlement,” Antara, September 5, 2007.
17. J. Colmey and D. Liebhold, “Suharto Inc: All in the Family,” 
 
Time Asia
 
, May 24, 1999.
18. Reporters Sans Frontières [Reporters without Borders], “Supreme Court Orders Time Asia
to Pay Former Dictator 100 Million Dollars in Damages,” September 11, 2007, 
 

 
http://www.rsf.
org/article.php3?id_article
 

 
23614
 

 
, accessed October 7, 2007.
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discovered by the judicial review that BIN Second Deputy Manunggal Maladi
had ordered Munir’s death.
 
19
 
 BIN has consistently refused to cooperate with
the investigation. On September 27, 2007, two more suspects in the case,
former Garuda director Indra Setiawan and former Garuda secretary of secu-
rity Rohainil Aini were charged with Munir’s murder. However, investigations
into links between the case and BIN continued to be thwarted by the agency.
 
Armed Forces Reform
 
While reform of the TNI continued to be one of Indonesia’s top priorities in
2007, this process was overshadowed by the purchase of new military hard-
ware from Russia. Meeting at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum in
Sydney in September, President Yudhoyono and Russia’s President Vladimir
Putin agreed to a $1.335 billion arms deal that would see Russia supply In-
donesia with two Kilo-class advanced conventional submarines, 20 amphibi-
ous tanks, 22 passenger and attack helicopters, and six Sukhoi jet fighters. It
was the first military hardware deal between Indonesia and Russia since the
then-Soviet Union provided Indonesia with weapons under a deal agreed upon
in 1960.
The move to buy Russian military hardware, based on a no-interest 15-year
loan, was seen as a direct response to Indonesia’s having been cut off from
U.S. military hardware following arms bans from 1991 until 2006 in response
to human rights violations in East Timor and Papua New Guinea.
 
20
 
 The mili-
tary deal paralleled a $5.5 billion oil and mining investment package, boosting
Russian interest in Indonesia up from less than $700 million in 2006.
 
21
 
 At the
same time, details emerged about how two Indonesian submarines shadowed
an Australian naval vessel off the coast of East Timor in 1999, bringing the
two countries close to a full-scale military confrontation.
 
22
 
Despite continued rhetoric around military reform, and the liberalizing in-
fluence of TNI head Air Chief Marshal Djoko Suyanto, reform continued at a
slow pace in 2007, including the de-linking of the TNI from business activi-
ties, which had frustrated practical civilian control of the military. TNI spokes-
man Rear Marshal Sagom Tamboen confirmed that the TNI would hand over
its businesses to the government but added that the government would be re-
sponsible for meeting the military’s funding shortfall—which, however, it failed
 
19. Asiana Press Agency, “INDONESIA: Extra-judicial Killing; Violence against Activist; In-
effective Investigation; Witness Protection; Impunity,” August 31, 2007, 
 

 
http://www.asiana-press-
agency.com/appeals/2007-0831.html
 

 
, accessed October 8, 2007.
20. P. Watson, “Russia Moves to Strengthen Ties to Indonesia,” 
 
Los Angeles Times
 
, September
7, 2007; R. McDowell, “Russia Signs $1 Billion Defense Deal with Indonesia,” Associated Press,
Jakarta, September 6, 2007.
21. “Jakarta, Moscow Rekindle Ties with a Bang,” 
 
Straits Times
 
, Singapore, September 7, 2007.
22. P. Daley, “Indonesia Bulks up Naval Defense,” 
 
Bulletin
 
, Sydney, September 11, 2007.
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to do. Meanwhile, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono rejected civilian juris-
diction over military personnel, including for civil crimes, thereby flouting in-
ternational standards for military accountability. However, the shooting dead
by Marines of four protesters over a land dispute at Pasuran, East Java, was a
dark reminder of the military’s former methods. More positively, the appoint-
ment of the army chief and former assistant to President Yudhoyono in a former
military role, Djoko Santoso, as TNI head in November 2007 indicated the re-
form process would continue.
On security issues, the Islamist terrorist organization Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI)
was believed to be continuing to function, but in a significantly weakened state
following the capture of its leader, Zarkasi, since 2004 and its chief bomb-
maker, Abu Dujana, in June 2007. Regarding more natural threats, Indonesia
continued to be prone to geological instability in 2007, with an earthquake oc-
curring in March in West Sumatra that killed 70. More closely related to human
activity was a devastating mudslide in East Java beginning in May, which de-
stroyed four villages and left more than 11,000 homeless. The mudslide was
thought to have been triggered by nearby drilling for natural gas by a company,
Lapindo Brantas, owned by the family of Peoples’ Welfare Minister Aburizal
Bakrie, which was required to carry costs for the displacement estimated at
around $200 million.
 
23
Fragmentation
 
Following the internal turmoil that Indonesia experienced in the wake of the
demise of the New Order, by 2007 a sense of unity had returned to the state.
The 2001 regional autonomy legislation was functioning, if sometimes weakly,
and Indonesia’s separatist rebellions had all but ended. The 2005 peace agree-
ment for Aceh continued to hold, although with shortcomings. In particular,
the Indonesian government’s Law of the Governing of Aceh (LoGA) failed to
fulfill a number of aspects of the peace agreement, and the law’s provisions
were watered down in practice. Notable problems included the inadequate dis-
tribution of funds for the reintegration of former separatist guerrillas; rejection
of the bid by GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the Free Aceh Movement) to
register as a political party; and localized attempts to intimidate former GAM
members.
More positively, the December 2006 Aceh elections were successful, show-
ing a strong pro-GAM vote.
 
24
 
 By-elections in three sub-districts were also held
 
23. J. Aglionby, “Catastrophic Mudslide Could Last 100 Years, Say Scientists,” 
 
Guardian
 
,
London, September 26, 2007.
24. “Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh,” International Crisis Group, Jakarta/Brussels, March
22, 2007.
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successfully in 2007, if with some initial reluctance by former anti-separatist
militia members to accept the pro-GAM results.
 
25
 
At the other end of the archipelago, representatives of Papua’s indigenous po-
litical organizations, including the Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua
Merdeka, OPM), held a leaders’ meeting at a secret location in September and
agreed to set up an umbrella body, the West Papua National Coalition for Lib-
eration (WPNCL).
 
26
 
 The coalition immediately called for negotiations with the
Indonesian government over the future of Papua. Notably, while it put a referen-
dum on Papua’s future at the top of its list of demands,
 
27
 
 the coalition appeared
ready to negotiate for an alternative political arrangement within Indonesia, in-
cluding more completely fulfilling the commitments of the 2001 special auton-
omy provisions.
 
Conclusion
 
In 2007, Indonesia continued on its slow and sometimes inconsistent road to-
ward reform under the cautious liberal leadership of President Yudhoyono.
The president came under increased criticism during the year for being slow to
produce results on the one hand, and as part of Indonesia’s internal political
competition on the other. However, the country also posted steady if unspec-
tacular economic improvements. The state appeared more, rather than less, co-
hesive. Most expressions of concern over Indonesia’s slow development, often
directed at the president, reflected less his direction or ability and much more
the wider lack of bureaucratic capacity, coupled with an administratively com-
plex and economically fragmented state and lingering problems of localized
corruption.
In large part, it would be unrealistic to expect a state as large, unwieldy, and
underdeveloped as Indonesia to develop quickly following the economic col-
lapse of the late 1990s. On balance, 2007 made another relatively steady step
on the sometimes unclear and often obstacle ridden path of economic develop-
ment and political reform. If expectations were not always met, that probably
reflected hard reality failing to match the sometimes unrealistic hopes held for
it. Under such political pressure, the state continued its slow movement away
from, rather than back toward, authoritarianism, a modest and overall positive
indication for Indonesia’s future.
 
25. “Tak Ada Republik Agara” [There will not be a Central Aceh Republic], 
 
Serambi 
 
[Verandah],
Banda Aceh, September 1, 2007.
26. WPCNL, “Statement of Claims against the Government of Indonesia,” West Papua People’s
Representative Office, Port Vila, Vanuatu, October 5, 2007.
27. Ibid., “Media Statement.”
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